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Alienage as a Suspect Class: Nonimmigrants and the Equal Protection Clause
Ariel Subourne

I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States of America has traditionally been a country of opportunity for many
legal immigrants. But the process of establishing themselves in their new home has never been
easy on immigrants, who have historically faced legal discrimination, including laws aimed at
preventing them from working. In Takashi v. Fish and Game Commission, the Supreme Court
noted that “[t]he assertion of an authority to deny to aliens the opportunity of earning a
livelihood when lawfully admitted to the state would be tantamount to the assertion of the right
to deny them entrance and abode, for in ordinary cases they cannot live where they cannot
work.”1 Yet today, a group of legal immigrants are facing precisely this dilemma in parts of the
United States. Nonimmigrants, a class of legal aliens who reside in the United States under
temporary visas,2 have recently brought a series of challenges to laws that discriminated against
them on basis of their legal status.3 Decades after the Supreme Court ruled in Takashi, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals invoked this case when it concluded that the State of New York
could not prevent immigrants with temporary work visas from becoming licensed pharmacists in
the state.4 This ruling was the first in a series of steps needed by the court system to prevent
state discrimination against nonimmigrants. The courts should evaluate discriminatory state laws
under the Equal Protection Clause using strict scrutiny review, both because nonimmigrants are a

1

334 U.S. 410, 416 (1948) (the Supreme Court struck down a law preventing people of Japanese descent, who were
at the time ineligible for citizenship because of their race, from receiving fishing licenses).
2
RICHARD D. STEEL: STEEL ON IMMIGRATION LAW, §2.23 (2d ed. 2012).
3
See infra Part III.B.
4
Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 81 (2d Cir. 2012).
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suspect class and because the Supreme Court has previously ruled that classifications based on
alienage are reviewed using strict scrutiny.
In 1971, the United States Supreme Court in Graham v. Richardson confronted the
question of whether the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited states
from discriminating between residents on the basis of alien status.5 In doing so, the Supreme
Court had to determine whether it would review the laws under rational basis review, a standard
that is very deferential to the government, or strict scrutiny, the highest level of equal protection
review.6 The Court held that “classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality
or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.”7 After Graham, it appeared
that the debate over whether the Equal Protection clause prohibited alienage-based
discrimination might have been resolved. In recent years, the Supreme Court has considered the
difference between the rights afforded to undocumented immigrants versus legal immigrants
several times. But the Court has yet to address what safeguards the Equal Protection Clause
affords to nonimmigrants.
A question has arisen as to whether Graham’s analysis truly applies to alienage as a class,
or if the Supreme Court merely afforded strict scrutiny review to a specific subset of legal
immigrants, legal permanent residents, and not to nonimmigrants.8 Three of the Circuit Courts
of Appeal have addressed this issue within the last ten years. Both the Fifth and the Sixth
Circuits have concluded that rational basis review applies to laws that discriminate against
nonimmigrants.9 These two Circuit Courts have found that Graham’s holding only applies to

5

403 U.S. 365, 366 (1971).
See infra Part II.A.
7
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
8
See infra Part III.A.1.
9
See LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2005); Van Staden v. St. Martin, 664 F.3d 56 (5th Cir. 2011); League
of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523 (6th Cir. 2007).
6
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legal permanent residents and not to nonimmigrants.10 The Second Circuit in Dandamudi
disagreed, finding that Graham’s holding applied to nonimmigrants as well.11 The Second
Circuit thus split from the Fifth and Sixth Circuits as to the appropriate level of review of such
claims under the Equal Protection Clause.12 As a result, the legitimacy of laws that discriminate
against nonimmigrants varies depending on the part of the country the nonimmigrant resides in.
This legal discrepancy could cause serious problems for nonimmigrants in the United States.
This Comment addresses this present circuit split and argues that courts should review
laws that discriminate against nonimmigrants using strict scrutiny analysis under the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. Nonimmigrants are a suspect class, which
has historically warranted the application of a strict scrutiny standard of review. In addition, the
Supreme Court’s holding in Graham was meant to establish strict scrutiny as the appropriate
standard of review for alienage as a whole. For these reasons, strict scrutiny is the appropriate
level of review. Part II of this Comment contains a brief overview of immigration law and how
it categorizes different classes of immigrants, as well as a brief discussion of the standards of
review under the Equal Protection Clause. Part III contains an analysis of the Supreme Court
case law on immigration and equal protection challenges, and a discussion of the current federal
appellate and district court cases covering challenges to laws that restrict the rights and privileges
of nonimmigrants. Part IV then discusses a variety of approaches to preventing legal
discrimination against nonimmigrants and the consequences of each suggested approach. Part V
concludes that courts should review laws that discriminate against nonimmigrants under the strict
scrutiny standard of review.
II.
10

Id.
Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 81.
12
Id. at 78–79.
11

BACKGROUND

4
A.

The Equal Protection Clause and Levels of Review
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution states that “no state shall. .

. deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”13 Historically, the
Supreme Court applied the Equal Protection Clause to state laws that discriminated against
different groups in an uneven manner.14 The Court later developed a more specific method of
deciding Equal Protection cases beginning with United States v. Carolene Products.15 In
footnote four, the Supreme Court noted that it might apply “more exacting judicial scrutiny” to
laws depending on, among other things, whether the law discriminated between “particular
religious. . . or national. . . or racial minorities. . .” or “discrete and insular minorities. . . .”16 The
Supreme Court later adopted the idea that it was appropriate to apply different levels of scrutiny
to laws depending on what groups they were distinguishing between.17 The Supreme Court
eventually developed three levels of scrutiny: strict scrutiny, intermediate or heightened scrutiny,
and rational basis.18
Strict scrutiny is the most exacting level of Equal Protection review. To pass, the
proponent of the law must show that they are pursuing a compelling government interest and that
the law is narrowly tailored and necessary to achieve this interest.19 The courts will apply strict
scrutiny review to classifications based on race or national origin.20 The Supreme Court has also
applied strict scrutiny review to classifications based on alienage,21 though whether
classifications based on alienage always trigger strict scrutiny review is, of course, the subject of
13

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW–SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE, §
18.3(a)(i) (5th ed. 2012).
15
See 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
16
U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
17
ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 14, at § 18.3(a)(v).
18
Id.
19
Id. at § 12.3(a)(iii).
20
Id.
21
See Graham, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); infra Part III.A.1.
14
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some debate.22 Rational basis is the lowest level of scrutiny and is the default applied by the
courts in absence of a reason for a heightened level of scrutiny.23 The courts evaluate only
whether the classification has a rational relationship to some legitimate end that the government
is pursuing.24 While the specific formulation varies, intermediate scrutiny generally requires a
court to evaluate whether there is an important government objective that is substantially related
to the government action at issue.25 The Supreme Court has also applied an intermediate level in
some cases, such as those discriminating on the basis of gender.26 In some particular
circumstances, the Supreme Court has also applied intermediate scrutiny to undocumented
immigrants.27
The appropriate level of classification is determined by evaluating whether the group in
question is a “suspect class” for the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause.28 Whether a class is
suspect can depend on a variety of factors, such as if the class is a “discrete and insular minority.
. .”29 or has been “subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to
such a position of political powerlessness. . . .”30 If a court finds that the group in question is a
suspect class, it will apply strict scrutiny review.31 If the group has some of the characteristics of
a suspect class, a court may choose to apply a heightened form of scrutiny.32 But if the class is
not suspect, it is unlikely that a court will apply anything other than rational basis scrutiny. 33
Courts generally give a strong presumption of constitutionality to laws reviewed under rational
22

See infra Part IV.A.1.
ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 14, at § 18.3(a)(ii).
24
Id.
25
Id. at § 18.3(a)(iv).
26
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976).
27
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982); see infra Part III.A.2.
28
ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 14, at § 18.3(a)(iii).
29
Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
30
San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
31
ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 14, at § 18.3(a)(iii).
32
Id. at § 18.3(a)(iv).
33
Id. at § 18.3(a)(ii).
23

6
basis.34 Therefore, heightened levels of scrutiny are far more advantageous to plaintiffs
challenging these classifications.
B.

The Classification of Aliens Under United States Law
Immigration law in the United States divides aliens into three major categories: legal

permanent residents, nonimmigrants, and undocumented immigrants.35 The first category
contains legal permanent residents (herein “LPRs”).36 Also referred to simply as immigrants,
LPRs have the intention to stay in the United States permanently.37 LPRs obtain legal permits,
often referred to as green cards, that allow them to remain in the United States permanently.38
LPRs can achieve permanent resident status through a variety of means, though the most
common include “through family relationships, through a job, or as a refugee or asylee.”39 The
second category of aliens is undocumented immigrants or “illegal aliens”. Undocumented
immigrants generally have less legal rights due to their illegal status.40
The final category of immigrants is nonimmigrants, who are temporary, legal aliens.41
Nonimmigrants come to the United States temporarily “to engage in an activity encompassed
within one of the nonimmigrant classifications set forth in the [Immigration and Nationality
Act].” 42 Nonimmigrants are required to establish “eligibility within one of the principal
nonimmigrant classifications or one of the subclassifications” in order to qualify for a visa.43
The category covers a variety of individuals, such as “temporary workers, students, foreign

34

Id. at § 18.3(a)(v).
STEEL, supra note 2, at §2.23.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id. at § 2.24.
40
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 222.
41
STEEL, at §2.23.
42
Id. at §3.1.
43
Id. at §2.28.
35
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diplomats, tourists, and business travelers.”44 The INA only permits nonimmigrants to remain in
the United States for a finite period, though that period varies depending on the type of
nonimmigrant visa.45
This Comment focuses on nonimmigrants, and specifically those that are in the United
States for a longer period of time, such as those with work or student visas. There are several
types of student visas; nonimmigrants can attend a college program with an F–1 visa, while
Mexican and Canadian students can receive an F–3 visa for a similar purpose.46 The
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) also provides for a variety of temporary work visas, such
as H–1B and H–1C visas.47 Additionally, “TN” immigrants are a class of nonimmigrants created
under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).48 Workers with H–1B, H–1C, and
TN visas typically stay in the United States for an initial period of three years, and can later
receive a three–year extension of the initial period.49 Thus, the work period is technically
restricted to six years.50 But many nonimmigrants remain in the country for longer, as “federal
law permits many aliens with TN or H1–B status to maintain their temporary worker
authorization for a period greater than six years.”51 Generally, nonimmigrants enter the United
States on a temporary basis and must attest that they do not intend to remain in the United States
past the time allowed by their visa52

44

Justin Storch, Legal Impediments Facing Nonimmigrants Entering Licensed Professions, 7 MOD. AM. 12, 13
(2011).
45
STEEL, supra note 2, at § 3.12.
46
Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15)(f), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(15)(F) (2012); 22 C.F.R. § 41.12 (2012);
see also STEEL, supra note 2, at § 3.12.
47
Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101 (2010).
48
8 C.F.R. § 214.6.
49
Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 70.
50
Id. at 71.
51
Id.
52
Storch, supra note 44, at 13.
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This Comment focuses on nonimmigrants with work visas because they are some of the
longer-staying nonimmigrant classes. As a result, discriminatory laws disproportionately affect
them as a group. Additionally, the limited case law on nonimmigrants and the Equal Protection
Clause usually involves challenges brought by nonimmigrants with work and student visas,
because these laws discriminated against those particular nonimmigrants.53 While the analysis of
this Comment focuses on nonimmigrants with work visas, the conclusions are applicable to the
whole category. Nonimmigrants in general are in a legally vulnerable position because their
status under the Constitution is unclear.54 Therefore, the conclusions drawn in this Comment are
applicable to the whole class.
III.
A.

IMMIGRATION AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

Alienage Before the Supreme Court
1.

Early Rulings on Alienage

The Supreme Court initially determined the level of Equal Protection review afforded to
aliens in Graham v. Richardson. In Graham, the Court examined Arizona and Pennsylvania
state laws that restricted welfare benefits to citizens or long–term residents.55 The Court referred
to the plaintiffs, who all had some form of LPR status, as “lawfully admitted residents.”56
Arizona and Pennsylvania argued that the Constitution permitted states to “favor United States
citizens over aliens” and that doing so did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.57 The
plaintiffs argued that preventing aliens from accessing welfare benefits on an equal basis as their

53

See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.A.
55
Graham, 403 U.S. at 367.
56
Id. at 367–70.
57
Id. at 371.
54
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citizen counterparts was unconstitutional under both the Equal Protection Clause and the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.58
The Court stated that the restrictive welfare laws “create two classes of needy persons,
indistinguishable except with respect to whether they are or are not citizens of this country.”59
Invoking United States v. Carolene Product Co.’s famous footnote four, the Court found that
“[a]liens as a class are a prime example of a ‘discrete and insular’ minority. . . for whom. . .
heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.”60 As such, the Court concluded that their decisions
had “established that classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are
inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.”61 The Court stated that while it had
occasionally upheld statutes that distinguished between citizens and immigrants, those
distinctions had been necessary to protect specific “special interests of the State or its citizens.”62
Under the circumstances presented in the case, the Court held that the “State's desire to preserve
limited welfare benefits for its own citizens” was not a special interest sufficient to justify the
state’s discrimination against the plaintiffs.63
The Supreme Court focused on LPRs in its analysis. The Court referred variously to
“resident” aliens and “lawful” aliens throughout the opinion.64 The Supreme Court also relied on
the similarities between LPRs and citizens to support its conclusions.65 It held that “[a]liens like
citizens pay taxes and may be called into the armed forces” and that “[u]nlike the short–term
residents. . . aliens may live within a state for many years, work in the state and contribute to the

58

Id. at 368–69.
Id. at 368–369.
60
Id.
61
Graham, 403 U.S. at 371–372.
62
Id at 372.
63
Id at 374.
64
Id. at 367–70.
65
Id. at 376.
59
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economic growth of the state.”66 The Court distinguished “short–term” residents from
permanent aliens, who share more in common with citizens.67 The Supreme Court also stated
that states cannot argue that citizens have a special interest in tax revenue spent on citizens
themselves when “aliens have contributed on an equal basis with the residents of the State.”68
By specifically framing the issue around the characteristics of LPRs, the Court may have been
limiting its holding to that specific group of aliens.69 As such, the holding would exclude
nonimmigrants and laws discriminating against them would only be subject to rational basis
review.70 Many courts and scholars have concluded the Supreme Court intended its holding in
Graham to apply to alienage in general, thus applying a strict scrutiny standard of review to
classifications affecting all classes of legal immigrants.71 Others have argued that the Supreme
Court’s holding in Graham applied only to LPRs and not to nonimmigrants.72 These differing
interpretations of Graham are the basis of the current circuit split over the level of Equal
Protection review granted to nonimmigrants.
Following Graham, the Court addressed a variety of other Equal Protection challenges to
state laws that discriminated on the basis of alienage. For example, in In re Griffiths, the Court
considered a challenge to a state law limited admission to the Connecticut bar to citizens.73

66

Id.
Graham, 403 U.S. at 376.
68
Id.
69
See LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2005); Van Staden v. St. Martin, 664 F.3d 56 (5th Cir. 2011);
League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, (6th Cir. 2007).
70
See supra notes 23–24.
71
See Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2012); Kirk v. New York State Dep. Of Educ., 562 F.Supp.2d
(W.D.N.Y. 2008); Adam Bryan Wall, Justice For All? The Equal Protection Clause and Its Not-So-Equal
Application To Illegal Aliens, 84 TUL, L. REV. 759 (2010).
72
See LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2005); Van Staden v. St. Martin. 664 F.3d 56 (5th Cir. 2011);
League of United Latin American Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, (6th Cir. 2007); Adam Bryan Wall, Justice
For All? The Equal Protection Clause and Its Not-So-Equal Application To Illegal Aliens, 84 TUL, L. REV. 759
(2010).
73
In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 718 (1973).
67
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Griffiths, like Graham, involved an alien that had LPR status.74 In concluding that the
Connecticut law violated the Equal Protection Clause, the Griffiths Court affirmed that
“[c]lassifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are inherently
suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.”75 As in Graham, the Court also emphasized the
similarities between LPRs and citizens to support its holding.76 The Griffiths Court stated that
“[r]esident aliens, like citizens, pay taxes, support the economy, serve in the Armed Forces, and
contribute in myriad other ways to our society. . .” and therefore the state “bear[s] a heavy
burden when it deprives them of employment opportunities.”77 The Supreme Court cited these
same factors to support the decision in Graham.78 These subsequent decisions had reinforced the
view that the Supreme Court, in focusing on the characteristics of LPRs, intended to limit its
holding to LPRs alone.
2.

Undocumented Immigrants

Undocumented immigrants have also challenged laws under the Equal Protection clause,
with varying degrees of success. The Supreme Court ruled on such a claim in Plyler v. Doe, a
case examining the legality of a school admission policy that restricted the registration of
children of undocumented immigrants.79 In Plyler, the Court initially dismissed the idea that
undocumented aliens were a suspect class.80 Specifically, the Court held that an individual’s
undocumented status did not permit the same level of constitutional protections afforded to legal

74

Id.
Id. at 721.
76
Id. at 722.
77
Id.
78
See supra notes 65–68.
79
457 U.S. at 204.
80
Id. at 223.
75
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aliens.81 Therefore, it seemed that the Plyler Court had decided to apply rational basis review in
the case.82
But the Plyler majority went on to emphasize that the class at issue in the case was the
children of undocumented immigrants, not just undocumented immigrants in general.83 The
Court stated that the law at issue “imposes a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children not
accountable for their disabling status.”84 The Court therefore required the state to point to a
“substantial goal” furthered by the law.85 While the Supreme Court explicitly stated that it
would use rational basis review, the “substantial goal” language implied that the Court was
actually applying some form of heightened scrutiny.86 Ultimately, the Court struck down the
restrictions on undocumented immigrant children under this heightened standard.87
Plyler complicated the analysis of how the Equal Protection Clause is used to review
laws that discriminate on the basis of alienage by potentially introducing a third level of scrutiny.
The Supreme Court stated in Plyler that it was applying rational basis review to the case.88 But
Plyler’s holding seemed to actually apply a form of heightened review to undocumented
immigrants as a class.89 As a result, the courts now have three levels of scrutiny that could
potentially apply to aliens. The Plyler Court emphasized the fact that the undocumented
immigrants at issue were children who were in a particularly vulnerable position through no fault
of their own.90 This focus on the vulnerability of children implies that intermediate scrutiny

81

Id.
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 224.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 230.
88
Id. at 222.
89
Id. at 223
90
Id.
82
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would not usually apply to aliens. Therefore, the actual holding of Plyler may be narrower than
it first appears.
3.

Nonimmigrants

The Supreme Court has almost never dealt considered the constitutionality of laws that
discriminated against nonimmigrants. Toll v. Moreno is the sole case decided by the Supreme
Court that contained an Equal Protection challenge to a law that discriminated against
nonimmigrants.91 Toll involved the University of Maryland’s decision granted preferential
tuition to students with a domicile in Maryland.92 Only citizens or LPRs with domicile,
however, could receive these benefits.93 The University policy exempted nonimmigrants from
these benefits, even if the particular type of visa the nonimmigrant held allowed them to establish
domicile in the state.94 Nonimmigrant students challenged the law, arguing that it violated the
Equal Protection Clause because it discriminated against nonimmigrants as a class in favor of
citizens and LPRs.95 The plaintiffs argued in the alternative that federal immigration law
preempted state law, which designated that nonimmigrants with G–4 visas could establish
domiciles.96
Rather than deciding the case on the Equal Protection argument, the Supreme Court
struck down the law on preemption grounds.97 After ruling on preemption grounds, the Court
held that it “[had] no occasion to consider whether the policy violates the. . . Equal Protection

91

Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 3 (1982).
Id. at 3–4.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 3.
95
Id. at 4.
96
Id. at 3.
97
Toll, 458 U.S. at 10–17 (The Court held that Congress has expressly permitted the classes of nonimmigrants in
question here to “establish domicile.” Maryland was not permitted to remove this domicile status, as the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution made federal law preempt state law. The Court “note[d] the substantial limitations upon
the authority of the States in making classifications based upon alienage” in deciding Toll.).
92
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Clause.”98 The holding itself was very narrow, dealing only with a very small subset of
nonimmigrants that were explicitly granted domicile status. 99 The Court did not even consider
the Equal Protection arguments presented in Toll.100 The Court seemed to avoid any discussion
of the issue, beyond recounting the District Court’s ruling.101 As such, it remained an open
question as to whether the Graham analysis should apply to nonimmigrants.
B.

Circuit Courts, Nonimmigrants, and the Equal Protection Clause
The federal circuits have only occasionally addressed challenges to laws discriminating

against nonimmigrants. Most of these cases arose within the last twenty years and are
concentrated within three circuits: the Fifth, the Sixth, and the Second. The Fifth and Sixth
Circuit Courts have held that courts should consider laws that discriminate against
nonimmigrants under rational basis review. The Second Circuit has very recently disagreed with
its fellow Circuit Courts, holding that strict scrutiny review is appropriate for reviewing laws that
restrict the employment of nonimmigrants. Accordingly, there is a current split amongst the
circuits as to the appropriate level of scrutiny for Equal Protection challenges to laws that
exclude nonimmigrants.
1.

The Fifth Circuit’s Interpretation

The Fifth Circuit was in the position of being the first Circuit Court to determine what
level of scrutiny nonimmigrants should receive under the Equal Protection Clause in LeClerc v.
Webb. LeClerc addressed an equal protection challenge to a law restricting state bar exam
admissions.102 Louisiana law only permitted only citizens or LPRs to apply to the bar.103 The

98

Toll, 458 U.S. at 10.
Id. at 17
100
Id. at 10.
101
Id.
102
419 F.3d at 410.
103
Id.
99
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class of plaintiffs, from two consolidated cases, held several different types of nonimmigrant
visas, including J–1 student visas and H–1B work visas.104 Several of the plaintiffs had entered
the United States under one of these types of visas but had then transitioned to others.105 The
plaintiffs maintained that the law violated their Equal Protection rights by distinguishing their
legal treatment from that of LPRs and citizens.106 The plaintiffs argued that the law should either
be evaluated under strict scrutiny analysis because “under In re Griffiths, nonimmigrant aliens
are a suspect class and state laws affecting them are subject to strict scrutiny”, or that it should be
evaluated under intermediate scrutiny because “nonimmigrant aliens are a quasi–suspect
class.”107 The Fifth Circuit dismissed these arguments and eventually ruled that rational basis
was the appropriate level of review.108
As a threshold matter, the Fifth Circuit concluded that In re Griffiths109 was not
applicable because it addressed discrimination against an LPR alien, and not whether strict
scrutiny review applied to nonimmigrants.110 The Fifth Circuit held that the differences between
nonimmigrants and LPRs were “paramount[.]”111 The court reasoned that the Supreme Court’s
decision in Griffiths turned on the fact that “resident aliens share essential benefits and burdens
of citizenship . . . in a way that aliens with lesser legal status do not.”112 The Fifth Circuit found
that Griffiths forbade the “total exclusion” of aliens in general, but did not forbid the exclusion of
some classes of aliens.113

104

Id. at 410–11; see supra Part II.A.
LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 410–411.
106
Id. at 414–15.
107
Id. at 415
108
Id.
109
Which, as previously discussed, held that the state of Connecticut could not prevent LPRs from sitting for the bar
solely because of their alien status. See supra notes 73–78.
110
LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 415.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.
105
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The Fifth Circuit then considered two additional arguments: that nonimmigrants
constituted a suspect class for the purposes of Equal Protection analysis, or that laws restricting
nonimmigrants in general should receive strict scrutiny as a default.114 The Fifth Circuit held
that though alienage classifications are “subject to close judicial scrutiny as a general matter[,]”
and all such classifications are not inherently invalid or suspect.115 The court pointed out that
after Graham, non–LPR aliens had received only rational basis review or, in the rare case of
Plyler, heightened review.116 The Fifth Circuit also held that the plaintiffs in Plyler only
received heightened review because they were children and as such the case represented an
outlier.117
The court reasoned that the distinct traits of LPR status meant that such aliens were
entitled to more searching judicial scrutiny, while nonimmigrants, lacking these traits, were
not.118 Specifically, the Fifth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court has emphasized two
conditions of LPRs that justified the application of strict scrutiny to laws that affected them: “ (1)
the inability of resident aliens to exert political power in their own interest given their status as
virtual citizens; and (2) the similarity of resident aliens and citizens.”119 In contrast,
nonimmigrants, “who ordinarily stipulate. . . that they have no intention of abandoning their
native citizenship” did not merit “the extraordinary protection” that strict scrutiny review
provided. 120 The Fifth Circuit placed a great deal of emphasis on nonimmigrants’ “temporary
connection” to the United States.121 The court concluded that “[a]lthough aliens are a suspect
class in general, they are not homogeneous and precedent does not support the proposition that
114

Id.
Id. at 415–416.
116
LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 416.
117
Id.
118
Id. at 417.
119
Id.
120
Id. at 418–19.
121
Id.
115
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nonimmigrant aliens are a suspect class. . . .”122 The Fifth Circuit therefore held that the
Supreme Court did not intend for nonimmigrants to receive a higher level of scrutiny and
“decline[d] to extend the Supreme Court's decisions concerning resident aliens to different alien
categories when the Court itself has shied away from such expansion.”123 The Court reviewed
the state bar exam restrictions under rational basis review and ultimately upheld them.124
The majority of the Fifth Circuit upheld the regulations on all grounds.125 But in the
LeClerc dissent, Judge Stewart disagreed with the majority’s decision to apply rational basis
review.126 Judge Stewart differed with the majority’s interpretation of Graham, noting that “the
Supreme Court's statement that ‘alienage is a suspect class’ by definition includes nonimmigrant
aliens as part of that class.”127 Judge Stewart maintained that the Supreme Court did not restrict
its ruling in Graham to LPRs, even though the Court used language referring to resident
aliens.128 Judge Stewart stated that “the Supreme Court has referred to resident aliens, aliens and
non–citizens interchangeably” and “residence and immigration status should be understood as
two separate distinctions; one does not necessarily have to do with the other.”129 According to
the judge, the Graham Court held that alienage in general was a suspect class.130
Judge Stewart also disagreed with the way the majority distinguished nonimmigrants as a
distinct class from LPRs. He argued that the distinction between the two classes was not great
enough to warrant different treatment under the Equal Protection Clause.131 Instead, he argued
there were enough similarities between LPRs and nonimmigrants in important areas (such as the
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inability to vote and a history of discrimination) to warrant nonimmigrants’ inclusion as a
suspect class.132 Judge Stewart also dismissed the alleged “transience” of nonimmigrant aliens,
noting that “not all nonimmigrant aliens are required to keep a permanent residence abroad [,]”
nor were they forbidden from intending to stay in the United States.133 The judge pointed to the
State Department’s acceptance of the doctrine of dual intent, which permitted nonimmigrant
aliens to “express a short term intent to remain in the United States temporarily (so as to not
contravene the requirements of the visa under which they entered)” as well as “a long term intent
to remain in the United States permanently (so that they may apply for adjustment of status).”134
The acceptance of dual intent showed that even the government acknowledged that
nonimmigrants were not, as a group, transient.135 Judge Stewart concluded that “[t]he
presumption should be that nonimmigrant aliens are part of the alien suspect class and the
defendants should have the burden of proving the opposite.” 136
Six years after LeClerc, the scope of Equal Protection rights for nonimmigrants was again
before the Fifth Circuit in Van Staden v. St. Martin.137 Van Staden addressed the
constitutionality of licensing restriction for nurses in Louisiana.138 Van Staden, a nurse
authorized to work in the United States who was in the process of applying for LPR status,
challenged a law allowing only LPRs and citizens to apply for nursing licenses.139 At the outset,
the Fifth Circuit concluded that the case was “controlled by LeClerc.”140 The Fifth Circuit held
that “[n]onimmigrant aliens satisfy neither of the conditions triggering strict scrutiny. . .” because
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nonimmigrants were neither discrete nor insular, had varied admission statuses, and lacked
political capacity only due to their temporary status.141 Additionally, the Fifth Circuit further
concluded that applicants for LPR status should count as nonimmigrants for the purposes of
Equal Protection challenges, and should not receive the same treatment as full-fledged a LPR.142
The Fifth Circuit thus applied rational basis review to the law, and ultimately upheld the
restrictions.143
2.

The Sixth Circuit Follows the Fifth

In the Sixth Circuit, the scope of Equal Protection rights for nonimmigrants arose in
League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v. Bredesen.144 In LULAC, the Sixth Circuit
agreed with the Fifth Circuit in holding that that state restrictions on nonimmigrants were not
subject to strict scrutiny review.145 Unlike the Fifth Circuit cases, which addressed laws
restricting employment, LULAC considered a law preventing nonimmigrants from receiving
driver’s licenses.146 LULAC, a non–profit organization concerned with Hispanic rights, sued on
behalf of its members, in addition to several individuals who could not obtain driver’s licenses
due to their nonimmigrant status.147 The plaintiffs alleged that the law discriminated against
them based on their nonimmigrant status, and that that discrimination violated the Equal
Protection Clause.148
Relying heavily on the Fifth Circuit’s analysis and quoting LeClerc frequently in its
analysis, the Sixth Circuit agreed that nonimmigrants were a dissimilar class from LPRs.149 The
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LULAC majority found that “there are abundant good reasons, both legal and pragmatic, why
lawful permanent residents are the only subclass of aliens who have been treated as a suspect
class.”150 The court reasoned that the case at hand did not provide any “compelling reason” to
extend “the special protection afforded by suspect–class recognition” to nonimmigrants.151 The
Sixth Circuit concluded that as “the instant classification does not result in discriminatory harm
to members of a suspect class[,]” rational basis was the appropriate standard to apply152
In a counterpoint to the LULAC opinion, Judge Gilman argued in his dissent that strict
scrutiny review was the proper standard of Equal Protection review for laws that discriminated
against nonimmigrants.153 The judge fundamentally disagreed with the majority opinions in both
LULAC and LeClerc as to the Supreme Court’s intention that Graham’s holding applied to
nonimmigrants.154 While acknowledging that the Supreme Court had “never specifically held
that temporary resident legal aliens, as a subset of all aliens, are a suspect class for equal–
protection purposes. . .” Judge Gilman deemed such silence irrelevant.155 He noted that the
Graham majority had not restricted its analysis to LPRs exclusively, but had instead applied its
reasoning to alienage classifications generally.156
Judge Gilman furthered criticized the majority’s reliance on LeClerc, noting that it had
adopted the LeClerc opinion “without even mentioning the numerous criticisms to which that
analysis has been subject.”157 In invoking Judge Stewart’s dissent in LeClerc, Judge Gilman
stated that the majority had failed address both that dissent and the other criticisms that the
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majority opinion had been subject to.158 In the end, Judge Gilman concluded that extending
strict scrutiny review to nonimmigrants would not be expanding the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Graham, as the Court had intended it.159
3.

The Second Circuit’s Disagreement

Prior to the summer of 2012, the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal were in limited
agreement that courts should review laws that discriminated against nonimmigrants under
rational basis review. But the Second Circuit departed the Fifth and Sixth Circuits in ruling in
the case Dandamudi v. Tisch that such laws should instead be subject to strict scrutiny review.
Even prior to Dandamudi, the Second Circuit seemed receptive to the idea that strict
scrutiny should apply to nonimmigrant Equal Protection claims. In 2008, the United States
District Court for the Western District of New York in Kirk v. New York State Department of
Education considered whether a law restricting veterinarian licenses to citizens and LPRs
violated the equal protection rights of an alien with a TN temporary work visa.160 The District
Court considered the Fifth and Sixth Circuit majority opinions as well as the dissents.161 It
proceeded to reject the theory that the Supreme Court had limited its holding in Graham to
LPRs.162 It concluded that “the challenged statute must be reviewed under the strict scrutiny
standard…” and that the law “fail[ed] to pass such scrutiny.”163 The Second Circuit never had
the opportunity to review the decision in Kirk, however, as the plaintiff received LPR status
shortly after the prevailing before the district court.164 One year later, the Second Circuit had
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another chance to address the scope of nonimmigrants’ equal protections right in the case of
Dandamudi v. Tisch.
Dandamudi addressed the constitutionality of a New York law that prevented
nonimmigrants from obtaining pharmacists licenses.165 The New York law required pharmacists
to either be citizens of the United States or be legal permanent residents.166 The New York law
had provided an exception allowing nonimmigrants to work as pharmacists, but it expired in
2006 and the legislature did not renew it.167 As a result, a number of nonimmigrants licensed as
pharmacists in New York brought suit, arguing that the licensing restrictions violated their Equal
Protection rights under the Constitution.168
There were two types of nonimmigrant work visas at issue in Dandamudi: H1–B visas,
which fell under the Immigration and Nationality Act, and TN visas, which fell under the
NAFTA.169 These visas permitted the workers to stay in the United States for six years under the
initial visa and the extension.170 Federal law permitted them to stay longer and as a result “[a]ll
plaintiffs in this case… ha[d] been legally authorized to reside and work in the United States for
more than six years.”171 Additionally, twenty–two of the plaintiffs had applied for LPR status at
the time the court decided Dandamudi.172
The Second Circuit began by stating that “[t]here is no question that the Fourteenth
Amendment applies to all aliens.”173 It then proceeded to discuss Graham, concluding that while
the Supreme Court never explicitly applied strict scrutiny to nonimmigrant aliens, “the Court has
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never held that lawfully admitted aliens are outside of Graham's protection.”174 Indeed, the court
observed that “the [Supreme] Court has never distinguished between classes of legal resident
aliens.”175 The Second Circuit therefore rejected the argument that Graham’s analysis did not
apply to nonimmigrants.176
The Second Circuit also addressed the Fifth Circuits position in LeClerc and Van Staden
and Sixth Circuits’ position in LULAC.177 The court proceeded to reject these positions for three
reasons. Initially, the court rejected the notion that the Supreme Court's discussion of “the
similarities between citizens and aliens” in Graham had articulated “a test for determining when
state discrimination against any one subclass of lawful immigrants is subject to strict
scrutiny.”178 According to the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court was merely supporting its
point in listing those factors, and was not creating an exhaustive test.179 The court further
reasoned that the Fifth and Sixth Circuits’ argument that Graham’s language limited its holding
to LPRs “reveals the danger of separating the words of an opinion from the context in which they
were employed.”180 In the Second Circuit’s view, the Supreme Court was merely stating that
“LPRs and citizens have much in common [and that] treating them differently does not pass
muster under the Fourteenth Amendment.”181 The Second Circuit went on to hold that “[t]he
converse of this rationale, however, does not become a litmus test for determining whether a
particular group of aliens is a suspect class”.182
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Next, the Second Circuit reasoned that “nonimmigrant aliens are but one subclass of
aliens, and the Supreme Court recognizes aliens generally as a discrete and insular minority
without significant political clout.”183 The court recognized that the Supreme Court in Graham
had not distinguished between different subclasses of aliens, but only between legal and illegal
aliens.184 Graham’s language specifically spoke to alienage as a general class and not to LPRs
only.185 Therefore, the Second Circuit explicitly rejected the Fifth and Sixth’s Circuits’ narrow
reading of Graham.186
Finally, the court found that even were it to decide the appropriate level of scrutiny based
on nonimmigrants’ similarity to citizens, it would still apply strict scrutiny “because
nonimmigrant aliens are sufficiently similar to citizens that discrimination against them in the
context presented here must be strictly scrutinized.”187 The Second Circuit pointed to a myriad
of characteristics common to both nonimmigrants and citizens, including that nonimmigrants pay
taxes “often on the same terms as citizens and LPRs. . .” and that many nonimmigrants also had
a far more permanent connection to the United States than other court had acknowledged.188
Specifically, the court rejected the Fifth and Sixth Circuits’ dismissal of nonimmigrants as a
discrete and insular minority partially due to the fact that nonimmigrants could only stay in the
United States for six years and had to promise that they did not intend to remain permanently in
the United States.189 Acknowledging that many nonimmigrants do, in fact, stay in the United
States longer, the court pointed to the dual intent doctrine, which provided that nonimmigrants
could express both “an intent to remain temporarily” under the their work visas and “an intent to
183

Id at 75
Id. at 76–77.
185
Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 77.
186
Id.
187
Id. at 75.
188
Id.
189
Id.
184

25
remain permanently” by applying for LPR status.190 The Second Circuit therefore concluded that
“[t]he aliens at issue here are ‘transient’ in name only.”191 The court reasoned that “[a] great
number of these professionals remain in the United States for much longer than six years and
many ultimately apply for, and obtain, permanent residence. These practicalities are not
irrelevant.”192 Acknowledging that the Supreme Court applied heightened scrutiny to
undocumented immigrants in Plyler, the Second Circuit also saw “no reason to create an
exception to the Supreme Court's precedent that would result in such illogical results. . .” by
applying a lower level of scrutiny to nonimmigrants than was applied to undocumented
immigrants.”193 Accordingly, finding “little or no distinction between LPRs and the lawfully
admitted nonimmigrant plaintiffs [in Dandamudi,]” the court held that strict scrutiny was the
appropriate level of scrutiny to apply in the present case.194
IV. ANALYSIS
A.

The Case for Strict Scrutiny
The Second Circuit is the first Circuit Court to hold that the Equal Protection Clause

requires courts to review laws that discriminate against nonimmigrants under a strict scrutiny
level of review. Even prior to Dandamudi, dissenting judges and scholars had argued that
rational basis was not the appropriate level scrutiny for nonimmigrants.195 The Second Circuit’s
ruling incorporated many of the arguments made previously by commentators, as well as by the
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dissenters in LULAC and LeClerc. As the subsequent discussion will show, strict scrutiny is the
appropriate level of scrutiny for laws restricting the rights of nonimmigrants. Binding precedent
from the Supreme Court clearly requires the application of strict scrutiny. In addition, strict
scrutiny review of laws that discriminate against nonimmigrants is necessary to protect a
vulnerable class of legal aliens.
1.

The Proper Application of Graham

Graham extended strict scrutiny review to all classes of aliens, and not only to LPRs. It
is true that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Graham did explicitly discuss LPRs and their
characteristics, and that the opinion did not mention nonimmigrants.196 The Supreme Court
stated that “short term” aliens did not share the same characteristics as citizens and LPRs, but it
did not define what it meant by “short term.”197 The Court may have made this distinction with
the intent to separate nonimmigrants as a whole from LPRs, or it could be distinguishing
nonimmigrants with shorter term visas.198 The Supreme Court did not decide this point, but its
opinion did not explicitly exclude nonimmigrants. The Supreme Court did, however, state in
Graham that laws discriminating against “alienage” as a class should be subject to strict scrutiny
review.199 This language implies that the holding was broad, not restrictive. The Supreme Court
may have focused on LPRs in Graham purely because the plaintiffs in the case were all LPRs.
As Judge Gilman argued in his dissent in LULAC, the Supreme Court’s silence on
nonimmigrants in Graham “proves little.”200 While the Supreme Court may not have
specifically discussed nonimmigrants in Graham, it did not explicitly leave them out either.
Indeed, in using broad language about alienage, the Supreme Court may have been explicitly
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including nonimmigrants.201 Had the Court wanted to limit its holding to LPRs, it could have
explicitly stated this, rather than using general language about alienage. The Supreme Court’s
silence in Toll, its only case presenting an Equal Protection question on nonimmigrants, neither
confirms nor denies that strict scrutiny is the appropriate level of review.202 The Supreme Court
has only explicitly excluded undocumented immigrants from its holding in Graham, and did so
largely due to their illegal status in the country.203 The Fifth and Sixth Circuits held that the list
of similarities between citizens and LPRs in Graham shows that Graham applies only to LPRs.
But the Second Circuit disagreed, holding that “nonimmigrant aliens are sufficiently similar to
citizens that discrimination against them…must be strictly scrutinized.”204 Thus, the Second
Circuit showed that the Graham analysis can easily encompass nonimmigrants as well as LPRs.
The Fifth and Sixth Circuits’ position, that the Supreme Court used language in Graham meant
to exclude nonimmigrants, has no textual support.205 There is strong support for the proposition
that the Supreme Court intended its holding in Graham to apply to alienage as a whole, including
nonimmigrants.
2.

Nonimmigrants as a Suspect Class

Even if Graham’s holding is limited to LPRs, nonimmigrants still deserve strict scrutiny
review. As the Second Circuit and dissenting judges in other circuits that have addressed this
issue have suggested, nonimmigrants may be suspect class for the purposes of Equal Protection
Clause review.206 As such, the courts would review laws discriminating against nonimmigrants
under strict scrutiny review.
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One common marker of a suspect class is the class’s inability to utilize the political
process.207 As the LeClerc majority suggested, because nonimmigrants as a class are so varied,
one cannot state that as a group they are politically unable.208 But the variety of nonimmigrant
visas available is irrelevant to whether nonimmigrants as a whole are unable to access the
political process as easily as citizens.209 Because of their legal status in the country,
nonimmigrants are just as separated from the political process than LPRs, if not more so. 210
Another argument against nonimmigrants as a suspect class is the lack of “permanency”
within the class of nonimmigrants. The Fifth Circuit tied nonimmigrants’ “temporary connection
to this country” with their lack of legal capacity, and concluded that nonimmigrants did not
deserve suspect class status.211 The Fifth Circuit held that because nonimmigrants were required
to promise not to stay in the United States and to maintain foreign citizenship, nonimmigrants
were transient and had no permanent ties to the United States.212 This is a very literal
interpretation of immigration law as to the permanency of nonimmigrant residence. The Second
Circuit disagreed with this interpretation, and found that most nonimmigrants ended up staying
legally in the United States for longer periods of time and ultimately received LPR status.213 The
Second Circuit noted that one of the plaintiffs in the district court case preceding Dandamudi
was dismissed during the appeals process because he received a green card.214 The previous
Second Circuit district court case, Kirk, was also dismissed for this reason.215
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Nonimmigrants are a suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause. They are
politically impotent, facing maybe of the same problems and prejudices as the LPRs.
Furthermore, the lack of permanency of nonimmigrants is an illusion, dispelled by the reality that
many end up staying in the United States legally for a long period of time, ultimately receiving
LPR status. Therefore, courts should review laws discriminating against nonimmigrants under
strict scrutiny review.
B.

Intermediate Scrutiny as a Viable Alternative
Short of reviewing classifications based upon nonimmigrant status under strict scrutiny,

intermediate scrutiny might appropriately apply to nonimmigrants.216 One could argue that if
undocumented immigrants receive at least heightened scrutiny under Plyler, nonimmigrants
deserve at least the same standard of review.217 Although the Supreme Court stated it was only
using rational basis review in Plyler, it is widely acknowledged that the Court applied a
heightened level of scrutiny.218 But this argument is premised on the assumption that the
Supreme Court was granting heightened scrutiny to undocumented immigrants as a whole, and
not merely applying it because the challenge involved children.219 The Court’s focus on the
vulnerability of the children in particular may indicate that the holding is very narrow. If the
holding is narrow, the argument that the Court intended to apply heightened scrutiny to
undocumented immigrants is weaker.
Alternatively, if the Supreme Court ever rejects the application of strict scrutiny to
nonimmigrants, intermediate scrutiny review would still be a preferable alternative to rational
basis review. Indeed, the Supreme Court has applied heightened scrutiny to several other classes
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that it deemed not “discrete and insular” enough to receive strict scrutiny, but that deserved
slightly higher scrutiny that rational basis review.220 Therefore, it is possible the Supreme Court
would chose to apply heightened scrutiny to nonimmigrants. The case for strict scrutiny review
is still strong, however, and it is the preferable standard of review.
C.

Preemption and the Supremacy Clause
Preemption arguments have shown up in several of the nonimmigrant challenges. Several

commentators have supported the use of the supremacy clause as a method of striking down such
laws.221 The argument is that the federal government occupies the immigration field in general,
or at the very least, specific statutes on immigration regulating the work of nonimmigrants
preempt state restrictions in the same area. Graham spoke to this issue when it held that “[s]tate
laws that restrict the eligibility of aliens for welfare benefits merely because of their alienage
conflict with these overriding national policies in an area constitutionally entrusted to the Federal
Government.”222 The Supreme Court therefore held that immigration is an area traditionally
occupied by the federal government.223
Most recently, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the federal government’s supremacy in
the immigration field in Arizona v. U.S.224 The Court stated that “[t]he federal power to
determine immigration policy is well settled.”225 The Court struck down several sections of an
Arizona state law dealing with immigration. The Supreme Court held that “The Federal
Government has occupied the field of alien registration” and as such “filed preemption”
prevented the states from interfering.226 The Court struck down other sections when the laws
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were obstacles in the fulfillment of the purpose of Congress.227 Arizona stands as an affirmation
of the overwhelming powers of Congress to control immigration law, and the limited ability of
states to add addition restrictions on immigrants.
The Circuit Courts that concluded rational basis review applied to states’ classifications
based upon nonimmigrant status accepted the federal government’s power in the immigration
field while arguing that federal law would not actually preempt the state laws. In LeClerc, the
Fifth Circuit dismissed the preemption argument, invoking both state police powers and arguing
that there could be harmonious regulation by both the state and federal government.228 But as
Arizona shows, the Supreme Court may be less inclined to allow states control in areas of
immigration than certain circuit courts have been. The Second Circuit in Dandamudi reasoned
that the federal government had control over the field of immigration, and preemption by federal
immigration law might disallow even complementary state regulation.229 The court concluded
that because the visas involved are permission from the federal government to work in a specific
field, the INA would preempt state laws restricting nonimmigrants from working in that field.230
The Supremacy Clause may not be the best way to eliminate states’ classifications on the
basis of nonimmigrant status, however, as preemption challenges do not necessarily resolve
whether all state classifications on the basis of nonimmigrant status are constitutional. For
example, some of the laws challenged in the Circuit Court cases addressed state laws that
restricted job licenses, which the work visa provisions in the INA might preempt; but another
involved drivers’ licenses, which might fall outside the federal government’s immigrations
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powers and more within the state’s powers. Additionally, the court in Dandamudi did not strike
down the New York license restriction on preemption grounds because some of the plaintiffs had
TN visas, which precluded that argument.231 Therefore, while preemption arguments are
important in resolving state authority to regulate nonimmigrants, they are not dispositive.
V.

CONCLUSION

Courts should review laws that discriminate against nonimmigrants using strict scrutiny
review. LPRs and nonimmigrants should receive the same treatment under the Equal Protection
Clause. Nonimmigrants have come to the United States legally for a specified purpose, such as
to continue their studies or work in a specific field. Many stay for a long period of time before
becoming lawful permanent residents, and eventually citizens. Yet, in several circuits
nonimmigrants do not receive the same protection under the law as LPRs. But they should;
nonimmigrants are as deserving of the protection that strict scrutiny review affords.
Nonimmigrants are a suspect class because they fit into the category of a “discrete and insular
minority”. They face many of the same problems as LPRs and are just as politically powerless, if
not more so. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has never explicitly granted them a lesser status
than LPRs and has implied that they deserve the same levels of protection. The Court’s holding
in Graham applies to alienage as a whole, not merely to LPRs. Therefore, any law
discriminating against nonimmigrants should be subject to strict scrutiny review under the Equal
Protection Clause.

231

Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 81.

